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"Perpetual Vigilance is the Price of Liberty," for "Power is always Stealing from the Many to the Few."

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SPEECH OF THE
Hon. Geo. E. Badger, of N. Carolina,
ON THE SLAVERY QUESTION,

Delivered in the Senate, Monday, March 18, 1850.

Continued.

Well, then, Mr. President, the question arises—for it is to this particular purpose that I make these remarks—what is it that we have a right to ask of our northern and north-western friends and fellow citizens, in reference to the subject of slavery? Being an existing institution, being such a one as I have described—it being absolutely necessary and inevitable, so far as any human legislation can be brought to bear, or any human foresight is to discover that it must continue—what have we a right to ask from our northern friends?

In the first place, we have a right to ask an effectual bill for the recapture of fugitive slaves. That must lie at the foundation of any pacification of feeling between the North and the South. Without it, every attempt to settle the agitating question will be as insecure and tottering as a house built without a suitable foundation. This is a question of right; this is a demand founded upon the constitution; this is not a matter of question or debate. If there is anything in the constitution free from doubt, difficulty, or dispute, it is that that instrument gives us a right to have our fugitives surrendered to us. If the constitution gives that right, it gives us, as a necessary consequence of it, a right to demand an effectual bill to carry out the designs of the constitution promptly, and as far as human means will avail, certainly.

Now, Mr. President, I desire to say a few words upon the subject of this bill—what it should be, what is the remedy which we have a right to ask, and which the constitution guaranties to us.

In the first place, I remarked that the framers of the constitution designed to carry out this principle—upon which this part of the constitution was founded—that, although the States existed under separate organization, they should still be considered as one to this purpose; that each should repose entire and absolute confidence in the integrity and capacity of the judicial tribunal and legislation of every other State to administer justice in regard to all its citizens and subjects; therefore, that, both with regard to fugitives from service and fugitives from justice, there should be an imperative obligation to restore the respective fugitives to the jurisdiction from which they escaped, and make them amenable in every respect to the determination of that jurisdiction; that the two cases stand upon the same foundations, and were intended to be governed by the same principles.

The provision of the constitution as to fugitives from justice is in these words:

"A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."

"Who shall flee from justice." But an innocent man fleeing from persecution commenced on false ground, maliciously persecuted, or to be tried by an arbitrary tribunal, is not in a strict and proper sense fleeing *from justice*; yet, within the meaning of the constitution, flees from justice who, being charged with treason, felony, or any other crime, in a State of the Union having a jurisdiction of the subject, leaves the State to avoid a trial. The meaning of the constitution was, that that jurisdiction shall be taken to have the capacity and integrity to determine justly; and therefore when he flees from it, whether in fact guilty or innocent, he is to be treated as a fugitive from *justice*.

As to fugitives from service, the constitution provides thus:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

The two cases are in principle precisely similar. The fugitive from justice is to be delivered up to the executive, who represents, in external transactions, the justice of the State: the fugitive from labor is to be delivered up, on the claim of him to whom such labor may be due, and each is to be returned to that jurisdiction to which he is properly amenable; and the question whether one is guilty, or the other is rightfully a slave, is not a question to be transferred to the jurisdiction in which the fugitive may be found.

This, Mr. President, was the view of those who passed the act of 1793. In the first place, that act of 1793 includes, under the same statute, provisions in respect to both of these cases. In the next place, it authorizes the delivering up of the fugitive from justice, upon the transmission of evidence to show that he has been duly charged in the State from which he escaped, and to whose justice he ought to be amenable.—And, in regard to a fugitive from labor, it authorizes the master, his agent, or attorney, to seize or arrest such fugitive," take him before any one of the officers named in the act, and upon satisfactory proof, either oral or by affidavit, &c., the officer is to give a certificate to the claimant, his agent, or attorney, "*which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labor to the State or Territory from which he or she fled*"—not shall be sufficient proof that the person delivered up is a slave or owes the labor to the claimant—not shall settle, or determine, or adjudicate the question. No; that question is open, to be settled by the jurisdiction of the State from which he escapes. Then he is returned. Then, if he is wrongfully detained in slavery, he must make his appeal to the proper tribunals. According to the provisions of the constitution of the United States, as recognised in this statute, it is to their justice and their impartiality the whole must be confided. And, Mr. President, it was all important that such a provision should be made. We know well that foreign States are not in the habit of surrendering fugitives from justice or from labor.—Each State seems to have considered itself benefited, as its neighbor was injured, by its receiving, countenancing, and entertaining fugitive slaves from justice; and when a slave escaped, as the law which recognised slavery was strictly territorial in its operation, of course the State or government to which he escaped denied the right to reclaim the fugitive. It was, therefore, indispensable to the formation of our constitutional Union that there should be introduced a provision by which the ordinary practice of States in regard to both of these cases should be reversed—a provision by which the domestic question should be left to the domestic tribunal—should not be transferred to another jurisdiction by the escape of the individual, but should in every case be submitted to the proper domestic jurisdiction, by returning the fugitive, whether the claims upon him should be for justice or for service.

It was said by the honorable senator from New York, (Mr. Seward,) that this was a compact in the constitution to be executed only by the States. Now, whether it was a compact to be executed by the States or not, is a question not distinctly open for our consideration at this day.

In the first place, I do not agree in the opinions which I have heard expressed by the most eminent gentlemen, that the Supreme Court of the United States has committed an error in supposing the jurisdiction was in Congress. Certainly those who passed the act of 1793 thought that they had jurisdiction over it; and the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that Congress has jurisdiction over it. It is therefore no more a compact between the States than any other portion of the constitution is a compact. The constitution forms a government. The legislative power of that government rests here, and it is for Congress to give effect to every provision of the constitution requiring legislative action.

Again, the senator from New York said that the slave States induced legislation by Congress—referring to the act of 1793.—Now, Mr. President, I did not exactly like that phrase. That the slave states, or the representatives from States owning slaves, had, in some way or other, prevailed upon Congress to transcend its power, with some view or other—why, sir, there is no authority upon earth for saying so. The act of 1793 was approved upon the 12th of February in that year. It was during the second Congress held under the constitution. It was just at the close of the Congress held under the rule of representation fixed in the constitution itself, and before the new modelling of the representation under the then first taken census, when Congress if I recollect aright, consisted of sixty three members. Now, I have taken the pains to look a little into this matter, and I find that this bill passed in the Senate of the United States apparently without contest. A division was not made; the yeas and nays were not taken; and there appears to have been a general and universal acquiescence in the propriety of the measure. I find that among the members of the Senate at that time were the following gentlemen, who had been members of the convention that framed the constitution of the United States: John Langdon, of New Hampshire; Roger Sherman, of Connecticut; Rufus King, of New York, Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania; George Read and Richard Basset, of Delaware; Pierce Butler, of South Carolina; and William Few, of Georgia—certainly I may be permitted to say a collection of highly respectable names—names of eminence before the country. In the House of Representatives the bill was passed upon the yeas and nays, and the vote stood, 48 yeas and 7 nays. Of those voting, who were members of the convention who framed the constitution were: Nicholas Gilman, of New Hampshire; Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey; Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania; Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, and Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia. And it is remarkable that every individual who had been a member of the convention that framed the constitution, and was a member of the House of Representatives at that time, who voted at all, voted for the bill, and not a single one of them is to be found among the small number of seven who voted against the bill. Those seven were: Messrs. Livermore, of N. Hampshire; Thatcher, of Massachusetts; Sturges, of Connecticut; Niles, of Vermont; Treadwell, of New York; Mercer, of Maryland; and Parker, of Virginia.

Thus, sir, we have this act passed at this early period, the passage of which was participated in by this considerable number of gentlemen who had been members of the convention, every one concurring in its passage in the Senate, without a division, and with a very small minority of opponents in the House of Representatives. Now, if anything can fix the meaning of this constitutional provision, it is certainly fixed by this bill. Upon the face of the constitution, this act of surrendering fugitives from labor is associated with the delivering up of fugitives from justice, provided for in the same general terms—the difference in the phraseology to be entirely accounted for from the minute difference in the subject matters; acted upon as such in 1793, by both houses of Congress, and that act never repealed, nor complained of, except as, from subsequent events, it has become inefficient to accomplish the end proposed.

But, Mr. President, we have carried this mode of delivering up fugitives still further. We have made extradition treaties with foreign powers; we made one with England in 1842—the celebrated Ashburton treaty, containing an extradition article—and one with France in 1843, and with divers powers, since. Now, what do these treaties provide with regard to foreign States? That we shall deliver up fugitives from such countries, upon such evidence of their guilt being produced as if their offence had been committed here, would justify their commitment for trial; and in 1848 we passed an act of Congress for the purpose of carrying into effect these extradition treaties; and by the second section of that act it is provided "that, upon any investigation had under the act, sworn copies of affidavits taken abroad may be used as evidence."

And who is the officer under these extradition treaties, to whom this jurisdiction is submitted? A commissioner, appointed by the circuit court of the United States. Now, all that we ask, is that there shall be such a bill providing for the surrender of fugitive slaves, upon the making out of such a case—a *prima facie* case—a case in which such evidence shall be produced before the commissioner as, if it were a prosecution, he would fully commit the party for trial—would deem him to be *prima facie* subject to the authority of the person who claims him, belonging to him, and owing him service or labor. Now, sir, are we not entitled to so much as this? Is it not an indignity to offer us less? Upon what principle should less be offered to us? Are we to be told that our judicatures are not to be trusted? that we will not administer justice? that we are in the habit of suffering persons who are free to be converted into slaves? that freemen may be kidnapped, introduced among us, held among us as slaves, and refused redress by our courts and our laws?—That is the ground. It is direct wanton, inexcusable insult upon the character and the judicature of every southern State. Upon what possible pretence can a discrimination be made? Great Britain or France sends here and demands that a certain person found among us shall be delivered up, to be tried for murder. We do not pretend to require *full proof* of guilt. We agree that, upon such evidence being produced as would justify and require commitment for trial here, the party demanded shall be delivered up to the foreign jurisdiction. Will you require more before you restore fugitives from labor to the jurisdiction of one of the States of the Union from which they have escaped?

Mr. President, such discrimination is in itself too insulting to be borne. The bill we want is not such a bill as the amendment to the one upon your table, proposed by the honorable senator from New York, (Mr. Seward) What is his bill, sir? Why, it has provisions for a jury trial. It has provisions for continuance, with its arrangements for bail bonds—bonds for prosecution and appeals. It is upon its face an invitation—an encouragement to accumulation of expense and procrastination of trial. How must it be considered by us? Is it not a plain "keeping of the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope?" Is it any thing less or more upon its face than the confession of a duty, accompanied by a plan carefully and studiously arranged to prevent the duty from being performed? Is it not worse than an open denial? That would at least be manly; but by this bill you say, I acknowledge I am under this constitutional obligation, but I will provide for its discharge by such means as will render that discharge impossible or worthless. To refuse us any remedy will be merely an inquiry; this is to accumulate the injury with a gross insult. It is to suppose us so stupid as not to be able to see through the most shallow artifice or to detect the most clumsy device for concealment. Now, whether it is so designed or not, that is the way in which it must be regarded by the southern people of this country, especially when they recollect that in 1793 your ancestors—the great men of your country—who aided in forming this very constitution, recognised the right of the South, the right of slaveholders at the South, to have their slaves delivered up on a summary investigation by an examining court, placing their right upon the same footing with the right of a state demanding one who is amenable to her justice. I have no hesitation in saying that for one, sir, I am against any such measure as that proposed by the Senator from New York. And if it were possible that this miserable expedient to hold out the show of relief, while all effectual relief is refused, could be incorporated into the bill before the Senate, I must unquestionably vote against its passage and resist it in every shape. However our understandings may compare with those of our northern friends, let me assure them that we are neither stupid nor foolish, but know very well that a protracted litigation in New England, New York, or the north west country, to be extended from one to three years, in such an investigation, and the result to depend upon a unanimous verdict in favor of the claim of the master, holds out an illusion to our hopes so thin and transparent that none but fools or madmen can take it for a reality. All we ask, Mr. President, upon this subject, is the same regard for the rights of slaveholders that was given in 1793—the same respect for and allowance of the impartiality of our laws, and their true and faithful administration, which are now extended every day to foreign powers with whom we have made extradition treaties. It is, sir, that we shall have extended to the one class of cases the same summary, prompt, and effectual remedy which the constitution intended, and which the act of 1793 extends to the other class; that those who are held to labor among us and escape shall be sent back again in precisely the same summary manner as those who are charged with offences and escape; and that our jurisdiction shall finally determine whether the charge be a true one in the one case, and the claim of service be well founded in the other. I have taken more time upon this matter, Mr. President, than under other circumstances I should be warranted in taking, because I feel that it is right that our northern friends should understand this matter to be of the very highest importance. If this cannot be conceded to us, then, as restoring feelings of confidence, as to making us understand or believe, in the southern country of the United States, that our northern friends and fellow citizens are generally disposed to do us justice, I do not hope or expect it from any other measure.—This is fundamental: this is a plain right: here is an evident constitutional duty. He who refuses to discharge it voluntarily declares that he regards neither the constitution nor good faith. He who undertakes to discharge it but in such a manner as to evade a faithful execution of the duty, does worse; for he trifles with both the constitution and good faith, under pretence of respecting and obeying them.

Now, Mr. President, I have submitted these views to gentlemen, and those only, who hold themselves bound by the constitutional obligations. If the sentiments uttered upon this subject by the honorable Senator from New York, (Mr. Seward) the other day are the sentiments of this body, I should not; and if I believed them to be the sentiments of this body, I certainly should not have spent my time in submitting any remarks to the Senate. And if the sentiments he has avowed here are the sentiments of the northern people generally—if he speaks even the opinions and feelings of the great mass of his constituents in New York—I say it is in vain to expect that mutual attachment and concord can be restored between the different portions of this country. What does the Senator say!

"We deem the principle of the law for the recapture of fugitive slaves unjust, unconstitutional, and immoral; and thus, while patriotism withholds its approbation, the consciences of our people condemn it. You will say that these convictions of ours are disloyal.—Grant it, for the sake of argument. They are nevertheless honest; and the law is to be executed among us; not among you; not by us, but by the federal authority. Has any government ever succeeded in changing the moral convictions of its subjects by force?—But these convictions imply no disloyalty. We reverence the constitution, although we perceive this defect, just as we acknowledge the splendor and the power of the sun, although its surface is tarnished with here and there an opaque object.

"We cannot, in our judgment, be either true Christians or real freemen, if we impose on another a chain that we defy all human power to fasten on ourselves. You believe and think otherwise, and doubtlessly with equal sincerity. We judge you not, and He alone who ordained the conscience of man and its laws of action, can judge us. Do we, then, in this conflict, demand of you an unreasonable thing in asking that, since you will have property that can and will exercise human powers to effect its escape, you will be your own police, and in acting among us as such you shall conform to principles indispensible to the security of admitted rights of freemen? If you will have this law executed, you must alleviate, not increase, its rigors.

"The constitution regulates our stewardship; the constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and to liberty.

"But there is a higher law than the constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same and noble purposes."

Now, sir, here is a distinct announcement, impossible to be misunderstood, that, though the persons to whom the senator speaks, reverence the constitution, yet they consider a law for the surrender of fugitive slaves, passed in pursuance of the constitution, as a violation of the constitution and as immoral!—Here is a distinct announcement that they consider it as a discharge of the high duties of hospitality, when they receive our fugitive slaves, entertain them, and withhold them from us. Here is an open and direct encouragement on the part of the Senator from New York (Mr. Seward) for slaves to escape to the freemen of the North, and for northern freemen to aid them in escaping. He assumes, then, that all will be received with open arms, and that the freemen of the North will therefore be considered as having discharged the high duty of hospitality. Now, sir, if that is the case, how perfectly idle is it for gentlemen to talk about respecting the constitution! He who obeys the constitution only in what he thinks right, does not obey the constitution at all—but follows his own inclination; and *he* who, having taken an oath to support the constitution, refuses to obey it because he thinks there is some "law above the constitution" which forbids slavery, places himself in the same position—taking for his guide his own individual judgment and opinion, above and against the constitution, which he can rightfully do only after surrendering the office he holds, and which he holds on the condition which that oath implies and intends to enforce. Here, sir, is a key to open the mind of the public to the honorable senator's bill. His purpose is to extend hospitality to fugitive slaves. He announces it to be immorality to surrender them; and he then comes here and presents an amendment to the bill for the delivery up of fugitive slaves, which, of course, must be intended to carry out the views which he has announced upon this subject. Such a position is indefensible—it is immoral. Talk about morality! Immoral for a man to hold a slave! Immoral for a man to do what the associates of Paul, and James, and John did!—Immoral for a man to do what the wisest and best men that ever lived upon earth have done; and not immoral to open your arms, contrary to the express stipulations of the constitution, to the fugitive slaves of your neighbor, to receive them, protect them, and throw around them such contrivances for making their escape effectual as no ingenuity shall be able to disentangle, and at the same time to taunt him with the declaration, "you are made your own police officer!" I have said, Mr. President, if these are the sentiments and feelings of the people of the North, generally—if the senator from New York (Mr. Seward) knows and freely expresses their opinions and purposes, it is impossible harmony can be restored and the Union preserved. For one, sir, though by no means extreme upon this subject—quite the contrary—I have no hesitation in declaring, if this is the general sense and belief—if this is the code of morals—if this is the feeling of integrity which influences our northern fellow-citizens, directly or indirectly, to set aside constitutional obligations, and deprive us of the property which we hold—if this is the purpose that we should remain in the Union. For what does that state of things imply? It implies this: that the States are associated together under a common constitution, binding them to discharge towards each other certain duties according to the terms of the constitution; and yet say to us, "We intend to discharge the amount of duty towards you that we please; for we reserve to ourselves the right of deciding when anything required of us opposed by moral obligations, and having so decided, to refuse its performance, while we hold you to the discharge of every obligation imposed by the letter and spirit of the constitution."—How could our connexion be long maintained under this state of things, with no public faith, no sense of private obligation, on the one side to induce, and no power on the other to compel, the performance of constitutional duties? We should be left in a condition not only distracting, but dangerous to our present rights whilst political immorality, bad faith, would render our future insecure, worthless. Nothing, under such circumstances, could keep us together but a deep sense of the greater evils of parting. We should remain united, if at all, not from inclination or duty, but from a stern necessity—not from the hope of good in our connexion, but from the dread of the consequences of separation. But, Mr. President, I have not the smallest idea in the world that the Senator from New York (Mr. Seward) speaks the opinion of the Northern people generally, or the people of any one State in the Union. I believe they repudiate his sentiments—they hold themselves morally and conscientiously bound by the stipulations in the constitution. I believe they will stand ready to enforce any law which Congress may pass upon this subject. I do not agree with some gentlemen here who have said, "Pass what law we will, it will not be executed." I have a very different opinion—a totally different opinion. This law may fail of execution in some instances; every law does. In the execution of this law, bias, prejudice, force may perhaps occasionally prevent its rightful results; but I believe that such a law passed by Congress will be faithfully and generally executed in the New England States as any law upon our statute book.

I doubt not that men there will understand that, though they may entertain an opinion that a law is wrong, yet as a citizen, they have no right, when called to enforce it, to act upon it in their individual judgment of its merits just as they would understand this: that if one were under sentence of death, their opinion that the law was barbarous and the punishment greatly disproportionate to the offence would not justify their interference, forcibly or by fraud, to prevent the execution of the sentence, the responsibility of enacting the law not being upon them, but upon those who made it. I believe there are many there—the great mass of the people, almost the total population—quite able and willing to apply these obvious principles to the particular subject under our consideration—the recapture of fugitive slaves. Yes, sir, I have the fullest confidence in the patriotism, the intelligence, the sense of justice and stern integrity of the great mass of people at the North. They will see that whether we have slaves or not is no concern of theirs; that if to have slaves be an offence, it is no offence of theirs; that if slavery be an evil, they do not endure it. And if it were wrong in itself voluntarily to surrender a fugitive slave who had escaped from his master, yet, as honest men and good citizens they will feel themselves bound to carry into effect a law passed in pursuance of the Constitution of their country—a constitution formed by common and mutual concession, and declaring that such fugitives shall be surrendered.

Why, sir, any other doctrine saps the foundation of society. The principles of the senator from New York renders it impossible to count upon the execution of any law. The judge upon the bench may say, when called upon to pronounce judgment, that the act of the legislature which it is his duty to enforce, transcends some moral obligation imposed on him by the law of God. He may say, I think the punishment immoral; I am of the opinion that no offence ought to be punished with death. What is he to do, according to the doctrines put forth by the honorable Senator from New York, (Mr. Seward?) I conceive clearly what he ought to do—either to pronounce sentence according to the law which he has bound himself by oath to execute, or to resign his office. But according to the views put forth by the honorable Senator from New York, he might continue to hold the office, and appeal from the law of the land to the law of God, and yet claim to be a loyal subject of the State and a faithful administrator of the laws of his country, yet leaving a law unexecuted while he holds his place and receives his salary. These principles destroy the foundations of all law and justice. They give us a fanatical and wild notion, that every man in civilized society has a right as a citizen to make his own judgment a rule of conduct paramount to and over ruling the law of his country.

Now, Mr. President, as I have said, no gentleman who admits the obligation of the constitution, who admits the obligation of this article of the constitution in relation to fugitive slaves, can deny the implied, irresistible following obligation to carry it into execution, just exactly with the same fidelity, good faith, and promptitude, as though it contemplated what, in his view, is the most desirable object in the world. This is the duty.—He is to execute this great fundamental law faithfully. It is the law to him. He swears to be a good and obedient servant to that law, and he has no right to render a less effectual obedience because he disapproves of the object of this particular part of this constitution.

Therefore, I have submitted these observations to show that according to the frame of the constitution, and according to the construction put upon it by those who aided in its formation—adopted with remarkable unanimity in both houses of Congress—this is not a case for trial by jury, but a case for a preliminary investigation before a magistrate, under prompt summary examination, upon affidavit or trial testimony, as the case may be—to be followed by delivering up the fugitive, upon the *prima facia* case made to the satisfaction of the officer who has proper jurisdiction of the question.

Mr. President, with an effectual provision upon this subject of fugitive slaves, I look for a complete and entire execution of that law in every State of the Union, as well at the North as at the South. I count upon it with the utmost confidence from the sense of justice and constitutional loyalty of the people.

The next question is, as to the Wilmot Proviso. I shall not agitate the question. I have not much to say about it. I shall now yield to the motion to adjourn.

(*To be Continued.*)

From the Marianna (Fa.) Whig.

The Secret Out.

It cannot have escaped the notice of the most casual observer, that since the advent of a Whig Administration, the opposition has been inspired with a new-born zeal in combatting the formidable monster, northern aggression. Locofocoism has been cast into the crucible of Calhounism, and concentrated to suit the times—and for what cause? Is it that the crusade against the South has become more fanatical, more threatening, more formidable? Is it because the big crisis has swallowed up the little *crisis*, and is now gaping peril at us with more threatening jaws, than under the former administration? We opine not. The Wilmot proviso is defunct in the abstract and the concrete. The recovery of fugitive slaves is no more difficult than formerly; on the contrary, it is faintly apparent, that the moral responsibility of abiding the constitutional injunction, in this regard, is beginning to be felt. If the northern monster shows his teeth now, he grinned much more voraciously towards the close of the late administration; and yet the present opposition then looked on with scarcely a shudder. In the canvass but a year ago, by the Nicholson letter, Mr. Cass was the very quantful essence of orthodoxy for the South. Then it was fully competent for *the people of the Territories*, whether the Free-Soilers, Indians, or *Negroes*, to settle the question of slavery for themselves. Now, when a Whig administration favors the admission of the State of California, with a constitution of her own choice, the act is stigmatized as a base betrayal of the South, and a sufficient cause for Disunion!

When, two years ago, Mr. Polk signed the Oregon bill, with a proviso attached, forever excluding slavery therefrom, the Democracy were silent as the grave, or mentioned the act approvingly; now, the simple thought of General Taylor's acknowledging the right of the people of a State to act for themselves in a similar matter, is the signal for decanting the full vials of their pent-up wrath. Oh! consistency, thou art a jewel! We do not wish, by this, to be understood as favoring the immediate admission of California, if, by delay, the whole question can be settled, and better terms gained for the South. Upon the question of slavery, and the protection of the South, nothing is *too southern* for us; and in the support of every act and measure tending to build up her interests, protect her honor, and defend her institutions, we shall be found second to no man; but we beg to be excused from co-operating with any opposition in breaking down a southern Whig administration. We will not believe General Taylor a Judas to the South, till he proves